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Educat  Consumers 
This is National Consumer Education Week. 
According to the U.S. Office of  Consumer 
Affairs, the week's schedule will feature 
numerous media events designed lito stimu-
late support for consumer-education pro-
grams and to assistconsuniers in dealingwith 
the problems of  inflation." This might thus be 
a fitting time to summarize what consumers 
have learned in an inflationary environment 
about how to handle $2 trillion in annual 
income. 
On the basis of  their recent behavior, house-
holds seem to have learned the laws of eco-
nomics reasonably well. They have re-
sponded to specific price shocks - especi-
ally the several OPEC oil-price shocks - by 
reducing their demand for higher-priced pro-
ducts. They have also responded to the 
upward surge in the general price level in an 
economically rational manner, by spending 
more and more of  their funds on tangible 
goods rather than depreciating paper. 
Higher living standards 
Another important feature of consumer 
behavior during the past inflationary decade 
was an ability to maintain real living stand-
ards in the face of a serious weakening of 
productivity. Real disposable per capita 
income - probably the best measure of  con-
sumer well-being  rose at a 2.25-percent 
annual rate between 1949 and 1969, but at a 
2.64-percent rate over the 1969-79 period. 
(Real spending showed the same trend as real 
income.) In contrast, the growth of real GNP 
per employee slackened considerably over 
time, with this productivity measure growing 
at a 2.42-percent rate in the 1949-69 period 
but atonly a 0.82-percent rate in the 1969-79 
period. 
Herbert Stein, writing in Contemporary Eco-
nomic Problems - 1979, notes that the ratio 
of  workers to population remained steady in 
the first two postwar decades, but then 
jumped from 40 to 45 percent over the past 
decade. Thus we offset a good deal of the 
slowdown of output per employee by attract-
ing more married women and teenagers into 
the paid workforce. 
Stein attributes this maintenance of real living 
standards also to the electorate's decision to 
reduce spending on national defense. In the 
1949-69 period, we increased the share of 
GNP devoted to defense, from 6.44 percent 
to 8.84 percent, but then reduced the detense 
share to 4.55 percent over the 1969-79 de-
cade. Because of  these two factors, then, the 
output avai lable for private consumption rose 
less than GNP in the earlier period but faster 
than GNP in the most recent decade. 
The 1980's may differ considerably from the 
1970's in this regard. The Administration 
seems to have strong support for its plan to 
boost defense spending (in real terms) by 25 
percent over the next half-decade, and con-
sumers of  course will have to bear the burden 
of  that shift in resources. Moreover, demo--
graphic factors will work against the expan-
sion of  the workforce, because of  the slower 
growth of  the pool of potential workers 
represented by teenagers and middle-aged 
homemakers. But by the same token, demo-
graphic factors favor an improvement in 
productivity over the coming decade, 
because roughly half of  the nation's popu-
lation growth over the decade will be 
concentrated in mature adult (25-44) age 
brackets. If this mature workforce can obtain 
better tools to work with (e.g., through tax 
policies to encourage capital investment), 
then the nation's productivity performance 
should improve, and the economy could 
grow fast enough to meet all the demands 
placed upon it. 
Response to price shocks 
The OPEC oil exporters will continue to be 
among the most persistent claimants on U.s. 
resources. But American consumers, al-
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nomic concept of elasticity, have deftly 
illustrated that concept through their re-
sponse to soaring oil prices during the past 
decade. 
According to a Council of Economic Ad-
visers' summary of recent elasticity studies, 
short-run (one-year) price elasticities of 
demand for gasoline range between minus 
0.2 and 004, while longer-run (five-year) 
elasticities range between minus 0.6 and 
minus 0.8. In other words, a 1  O-percent rise 
in price will lead to a 2-to-4 percent reduc-
tion in consumption in the short run, and to a 
6-to-8 percent reduction in the longer run. 
The data thus belie the common belief that 
demand for petroleum products is price 
inelastic. 
Even before 1979's dramatic price increase, 
the rising price of  energy had cut significantly 
into demand. Afterthe 1973 oil embargo 
(1972-78), the growth in per capita gasoline 
consumption rose less than half as fast as in 
the preceding six-year period, even though 
real per capita income rose at roughly the 
same rate during the two periods. This finding 
can be partly explained by improvements in 
the fuel efficiency of automobiles, although 
auto usage also dropped in the post-embargo 
period. Average miles traveled per car drop-
ped slightly between 1972 and 1978 - but 
would have been 10 percent higher if the 
1966-72 trend had continued over the fol-
lowing period. And households showed an 
even better conservation record in terms of 
total per capita energy usage. If the earlier 
trend had continued, total energy use would 
have been 16 percent higher than the 1978 
actual figure  which represents the saving 
of 6 million barrels of  oil a day. 
Households responded in the same fashion to 
the 1979 price hikes. Demand for all petro-
leum products declined more than 4 percent 
between the fourth quarter of 1978 and the 
fourth quarter of 1979, and gasoline demand 
fell more than 9 percent over that period. 
Also, drivers responded to higher prices by 
reducing their average mileag~ per car by 5 
2 
percent during the year. In  1979 as in earlier 
years, consumers thus showed a keen appre-
ciation of the concept of price elasticity of 
demand. 
Response to inflation 
Even stronger evidence of consumer educa-
tion in the economic facts of life can be 
gleaned from the shift of household assets in 
the inflationary environment of the past 
decade and a half. Over the 1952-65 period, 
as consu mer prices increased about one-fifth, 
households concentrated much of their asset 
holdings in financial (paper) assets, such as 
deposits and s.ecurities; but over the 1965-78 
period, as prices doubled, households shifted 
thei r attention to tangible (real) assets, such as 
housing and consumer durables. Consumers 
were encouraged in this direction by the 
legislative penalty imposed on saving in the 
form of  deposits, since Congress not only kept 
bank deposit-rate ceilings intact, but even 
extended them to thrift institutions at the 
beginning of  this inflationary period. 
The overall wealth-income ratio of house.,. 
holds increased about 9 percent between 
1952 and 1965, butthen declined about 13 
percent over the inflationary 1965-78 period, 
with net financial wealth plus tangible wealth 
equalling 4.19 times disposable income in 
1978. Between 1965 and 1978, the tangible 
wealth/income ratio actually increased 
slightly, but in contrast, the financial wealth/ 
income ratio dropped sharply from 2.15 to 
1.26 (see chart). 
Financial and tangible assets 
All types of financial assets were handi-
capped during the recent inflationary period. 
Household investment in corporate stock suf-
fered because of  the increasing uncertainty 
attached to stocks in an inflationary environ-
ment, according to William Fellner in 
Contemporary Economic Problems - 7979. 
Moreover, because of  the absence of  inflation 
adjustments in taxes on dividends and capital 
gains, the tax burden on securities owners 
rose in relation to real yields as the inflation 
rate increased. Otherfinancial assets, such as claims on money payments fixed in current 
dollars, involved substantial risk for pre-tax 
returns, and even greater risk for after-tax 
returns levied on current-dollar income. 
Tangible assets, such as housing and con-
sumerdurables, were not handicapped in this 
fashion by the recent inflation. Instead, their 
prices rose in current-dollar terms, and the 
prices of some indeed increased in inflation-
corrected dollars. And as Fellner notes, the 
expected real yield of these assets depended 
not on risky market prospects, but rather on 
the untaxed use value accruing to the house-
holds themselves. Moreover, such yields 
were not limited by price controls - by the 
statutory regulation of interest rates affecting 
certain financial assets. 
To buy real property, the average saver 
assumed an unprecedented amount of addi-
tional debt in the recent inflationary period. 
Well-developed mortgage markets, com-
bined with the favorable tax treatment of 
interest expense, encouraged individuals to 
leverage thei r savings sufficiently to pu rchase 
homes or investment real estate. Not surpris-
ingly, then, home mortgages accounted for a 
growing share of total credit demands, rising 
from 19 percent of total net credit in the 
1960's to 20% percent in the 1970's. 
Entering the 1980's, many consumers have 
shown considerable ingenuity in handling 
inflation. In fact, some have learned to cope 
too well, and may become somewhat reluc-
tant allies in the fight against inflation. Butthe 
right policy mix - including the continued 
dismantling of  deposit interest-rate ceilings 
and (above all) winning the fight against infla-
tion - could persuade rational consumers to 
take a renewed interest in paper assets rather 
than continue their flight into real assets. 
wmoam Burke 
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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH fEDIERAl RESERVE DISTRDCT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities'" 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves ( +  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
5,891  4.4 
7,284  6.6 
2,563  8.1 
7,025  17.2 
425  1.8 
1,133  - 52.2 
1,196  - 15.6 
197  - 1.3 
58  - 0.1 
1,950  6.4 
835  2.8 
10,255  18.7 
10,034  21.6 
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